Drug dependence is generally thought to involve a loss or reduction of individual autonomy. Yet of the 11 million people in the UK (27 per cent of the population aged 16-74) who have ever used illicit drugs at some point in their life, probably no more than 300,000 (1%) are drug dependent. Many commentators find the apparently self-destructive behaviour of problematic drug users difficult to explain. According to rational theory, choices are made with respect to a long timeframe so as to maximize overall utility. Under maximization, individuals cannot gradually slide towards a very high level of drug use at the expense of other activities as this would reduce their overall utility. The key to understanding drug dependence is that it involves 'matching' different behavioural combinations at any given point in time that do not take account of long-term consequences. There is growing evidence that drug users are much more likely to match compared to non-drug users and that they have difficulty in learning to maximize. We argue that current practice within the UK criminal justice system is implicitly based on the idea that relearning the value of alternative behaviours can lead to drug use desistance.
Substance abuse has been defined as 'the uncontrollable or excessive abuse of addictive substances, such as (but not limited to) alcohol, drugs or other chemicals and the resultant physiological and/or psychological dependency which develops with continued use'. 2 The World Health Definition has a more complex definition of drug dependence, but one key aspect is 'difficulties in controlling substance-taking behaviour in terms of its onset, termination or levels of use ' (WHO, 1992: 5) . Whether the term drug dependence, drug addiction or any other variation is used, there is a widespread belief that, when people's drug use becomes problematic their voluntary control is diminished to a greater or lesser extent. This belief is at the core of current policies designed to curb the harmful impact of drugs. A key aim of the UK government's Drug Strategy is to 'provide a positive route out of addiction ' (Home Office, 2002: 12) via education, prevention, enforcement and treatment; the implication being that people who are drug dependent cannot find this route themselves. The objectives of this article are to contextualize drug dependence within the overall patterns of drug use and to examine drug desistance.
The first issue to be addressed is the level of drug use in the general population. Table 1 shows estimates of the numbers of drug users in the UK. The most striking feature of the table is that over 11 million people have used illicit drugs at some point in their life, but of these probably no more than 300,000 go on to become problematic drug users. (Even when the very broad definition of drug dependence 3 is used only about 1.5 million fall into this category (Farrell et al., 2003) .) These data illustrate an important but often overlooked fact, namely that the vast majority of people who use drugs do not go on to become drug dependent. In other words, most drug users desist from drug use without ever having contact with the health or criminal justice systems.
Another way of looking at these data is to ask, what proportion of people who have ever used drugs continue to use them? Table 2 shows that less than half of 16-24-year-olds (who are considered to be a vulnerable group) continue to use class A drugs in the current year and less than a quarter in the current month. In other words, even among drugs that are considered to be among the most addictive, desistance after a period of occasional use seems to be the norm. In contrast cannabis, which is considered to be less (or non-)addictive, has considerably higher continuation rates.
There are no readily available UK continuation data for alcohol and tobacco, but Dutch data from 1997 indicate that continuation rates for alcohol and tobacco are higher than illicit drugs. These figures suggest that either it is harder to desist from licit substances than for illicit substances or that people have less inclination to desist from licit substances. Table 3 also shows that continuation rates for all substances generally decline with age. Thus there is a tendency to stop using substances as people get older.
When a large sample of young European drug users were directly asked, 'of the substances you are currently taking which would be the most < 1 6  6 2  8 5  4 5  2 6  16-19  59  83  21  15  20-24  48  74  13  14  25-29  57  67  18  12  30+  48  65  7  12 a cocaine, amphetamines, ecstasy, hallucinogens Source: Abraham et al. (1998) Frisher & Beckett-Drug use desistance 129 difficult to give up', the highest proportions were recorded for tobacco (40%), alcohol (30%) followed by cannabis (22%) and heroin (15%) (Calafat et al., 1999) . These data seem to indicate that, despite the widespread belief that hard drugs are addictive and by definition difficult to stop using, most people report that they would not find it difficult to desist from using these drugs. Whether this is actually true or not cannot be ascertained from this study but these self-report data concur with the continuation data shown above. Household survey data, however, are only part of the story and it is recognized that they are not a good way of obtaining information on more problematic drug users (Johnson et al., 1996) . People who, for example, inject drugs every day are unlikely to take part in such surveys. Thus the very low rates of drug persistence seen in the general population do not apply to such individuals. Among those who do persist, there is much debate on the mechanisms that lead from a relatively low level of drug use to a higher level of use and ultimately to addiction. Sometimes called the gateway effect, this is an emotive issue with various studies supporting or rejecting its existence. Analysis of the 1998/9 Youth Lifestyles Survey (YLS), led to the conclusion that the gateway effect from cannabis to harder drugs is very small. The report suggests that 'early soft drug use and later hard drug use may be joint expressions of the same underlying personal problem rather than a consequence of a causal influence of soft drug use on the subsequent desire for harder drugs' (Pudney, 2002: v) . An American study found that, from the population of cannabis users, 17 per cent had used cocaine whereas from the population of non-cannabis users only 0.2 per cent had used cocaine (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1991). This study has been interpreted as showing that cannabis users do have a much higher rate of cocaine use but that for the vast majority of cannabis users (83%) cannabis is 'clearly a terminus rather than a gateway' (Anonymous, no date a).
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Another way of approaching this issue is via twin studies. A recent study hypothesized that to the extent that their genes and environment are identical, any variation in hard drug use must be attributable to some other factor or factors (Lynskey et al., 2003) . The study population was 311 sets of same-sex twins in which only one twin had smoked marijuana before age 17. Early marijuana smokers were found to be up to five times more likely than their twins to move on to harder drugs. The study concluded that cannabis may change the brain (the classical gateway effect) but could not rule out other potential mechanisms, including access to drugs, willingness to break the law and likelihood of engaging in risk-taking behaviour. A systematic review of the cannabis use and its consequences among young people concluded that cannabis and adverse psychosocial outcomes seem to share common antecedents related to various forms of childhood adversity, and factors relating to peer group and family (Macleod et al., 2004) . The relation between cannabis use and harm might simply reflect these associations; cannabis use could be a marker, rather than a cause, of a life trajectory more likely to involve adverse outcomes. Although these studies address persistence rather than desistance they illustrate how different conclusions may be drawn from the same data. On the balance of available evidence the UK government's Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) recommended that cannabis be reclassified from a class B to a class C drug. 4 This took place in January 2004, since when the debate has continued unabated.
What of those drug users who do progress from softer to harder drugs? Figure 1 shows an index of problematic drug use among 101 young drug users who attended drug services in Stoke and Newcastle in 2001/2 (Beckett et al., 2003) . The data show a gateway effect in that this population tend to progress from soft to hard drugs, although it must be stressed that the vast majority of 13-year-olds who never come into contact with services probably do not follow the progression shown in Figure 1 .
As this study was cross-sectional it was not possible to trace directly respondents' developmental sequence. Nevertheless this group does appear to show the classic progression for lower to higher levels of drug use. Furthermore they persist with their drug use despite multiple problems (mental health, social skills and criminal activities), which as Figure 2 shows appear to be a consequence rather than a cause of their drug use.
As 
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Another user writes that, the rush from a blast of heroin, I think, feels like the sick feeling you would get when you land in a 747 when you're drunk. It made me want to puke the first time. After awhile of doing it, my stomach will get used to that, and it didn't bother me so much. The worm is addiction, and no I didn't get addicted the first time I did it, but I began to build a foundation for it that never goes away. Heroin withdrawals are the worst thing in the world, they are what make heroin like oxygen or food to a junkie. I regret walking down the tar covered road, it was fun at times, I won't deny that, but it's not worth the price I have to pay to join the junky circle and ride the heroin highway to hell. (Anonymous, no date b)
Many commentators (and policy makers) find this apparently selfdestructive behaviour difficult to explain. Most current explanations regard such behaviour as due to the drugs' extremely reinforcing effect on pleasure pathways within the brain (McBride et al., 1999) . Pharmacological studies have shown that many illicit drugs affect the brain's dopamine system, which plays a part in abuse by providing an emotional 'reward' for continued use (Volkow et al., 1997) . In this view desistance requires this cycle to be broken by medical intervention.
This article is not going to consider the literature on desistance via medical (or psychotherapeutic) intervention. However there is now a shift (as seen for example in the DSM-IV definition) towards regarding drug use in both pharmacological and behavioural terms (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) . This is an important modification because research has shown 'craving' and 'withdrawal', regarded by many as the core of 
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addiction, can be manipulated by factors such as the person to whom they are reporting their drug use (Davies, 1997) .
Such behaviour has been widely studied by psychologists within the framework of attribution theory (Eiser, 1980) . One of the main features of attribution theory is illustrated in Figure 3 . Figure 3a shows a still picture from a short film in which the red ball slowly moves to the blue ball and then the blue ball moves. Most observers report that the red ball hit the blue ball and the blue ball moved because the red ball hit it (Michotte, 1962) . In Figure 3b , the images move about on the screen such that the shapes seem to be chasing and fighting each other. Again nearly everyone offered this explanation for the film. Thus 'we have little difficulty in realising that the causal accounts are primarily psychological constructions, rather than accounts of scientific causality; mainly because we can see that the stimuli do not actually warrant the latter type of description' (Davies, 1997: 9) .
This approach examines why behaviour is 'attributed' to particular causal factors under different circumstances. The key concepts of attribution theory are that (a) people make causal inferences about non-causal events due to hard-wired perceptual processes and (b) based on this characteristic, their accounts of events have an internal logic that is independent of reality (Eiser, 1980) . Applying these principles to drug addiction has led to the current dominant view of drug use as an illness which removes or reduces the capacity for voluntary behaviour. It has been argued that this type of explanation is preferred because it is functional for drug users to report that they are addicted and driven into drug use by forces beyond their capacity to control. It is also functional for those advocating a medical explanation of drug use (Davies, 1997) . Davies and Baker (1987) found that drug users tended to report heavier drug use to interviewers who were university professionals than to interviewers who were fellow drug users. In other words, to the university researcher they projected the typical 'addict' image, whereas to their peers they did not have the same reason to do so. The implication is that the socalled addict chooses to act in a particular way and could just as easily behave differently. A further inference is that there is no underlying reality Frisher & Beckett-Drug use desistance 133 capable of being represented by verbal behaviour, but rather functional accounts determined by circumstances. If people are constrained by circumstances to give a particular account of their behaviour, can they simultaneously be free to give an alternative account? According to the attribution theory (at least the version of it developed in relation to drug use) the entire concept of addiction, as conventionally understood, has arisen because social and medical features of drug use have become mistaken for actual causality.
To some extent this view is similar to the existentialist philosophy found in Being and Nothingness by Jean-Paul Sartre (1958 Sartre ( [1943 ). In the book Sartre is extremely critical of psychological theories that in any way negate human freedom. To illustrate this, he imagines a waiter who behaves with the characteristic, if somewhat exaggerated, gestures associated with a waiter in a French café. Sartre imagines that the waiter could choose to behave in a different way and his insistence on playing a role is indicative of self-deception ('bad faith' in existential terminology). The essence of bad faith is that 'the liar is in complete possession of the truth which he is hiding ' (1958 [1943] : 48). However because Sartre's method ignores empirical data (Kaufmann, 1981) he does not consider the waiter's need to earn money, converse with customers, etc. Attribution theory also portrays the 'addict' playing a role in which addicts are condemned to represent themselves as addicts as long as the dominant view of drug addiction remains in force.
Whereas existentialism offers the chance of an 'authentic' life based on the drug user's active choices, attribution theory places the drug user in a web of social and medical relations which are the determining agents of how drug use is perceived in society. Both existentialism and attribution theory (as interpreted by Davies, 1997) regard problematic drug use as the product of decisions made by a free agent, where the free agency is either distorted by bad faith or constrained by functional attributions. However Skinner (1953) argues that we tend to give mentalistic explanations when we lose sight of the behavioural context for needing, craving, wanting, etc. These words conveniently summarize the complex relationships between behaviours and environments. In the case of someone who appears to be drug dependent we only have vague notions of how they came to be in this state. Thus it is easier to explain drug use in terms of an internal state, i.e. addiction or dependence, particularly when then they present in medical or legal contexts. Cognitive explanations are easy to understand because of their similarity to everyday language. However, attribution theory highlights why the use of these terms is problematic in scientific contexts.
One recent approach to treating drug addiction in its behavioural context is 'cue exposure treatment' which is based on the notion that drug use is a classically conditioned response (Conklin and Tiffany, 2002) . The concept of classical conditioning derives from Pavlovian experiments in which hungry dogs salivate to the sound of a bell that has been associated with the sight and smell of meat. Similarly, drug use tends to occur in environments that have paired with drugs (e.g. friends who are still drug users, neighbourhoods where drugs are easily available). However a literature review did not find any consistent evidence for the effectiveness of cue exposure treatment. One practical difficulty with this approach is that drug use is inherently reinforcing and so 'addicts never learn an alternative association with drug administration, namely that it does not lead to drug effects' (Conklin and Tiffany, 2002: 164-5) . Another type of learning is operant conditioning, which unlike Pavlovian conditioning, relies on the learner actively participating in the learning process. Thus if a novice drug user takes drugs and feels good in the presence of more experienced drug users then the probability of drug using behaviour will increase (i.e. the learner will actively engage in drug use). Alternatively, if drug use helps a person to escape from negative states then again the probability of drug using behaviour will increase. Drug use might be said to become 'addictive' where there is an extreme narrowing down of the range of behaviours that result in reinforcement. In fact, part of the World Health Organization's definition of drug addiction is 'progressive neglect of alternative pleasures or interests because of psychoactive substance use' (WHO, 1992: 5) .
Even if drug use is the dominant behaviour in a person's life, it is nevertheless still part of a behavioural repertoire. From a behavioural point of view, choice is not the expression of free will (existentialism) or the product of internal decision making but the distribution of operant behaviours among various response options and their reinforcement contingencies. If a person has three response options-(a) watching TV, (b) taking drugs and (c) working-and allocates more time to response option (b), then the subject may be said to have a preference for response option (b). There is a widely held view, dating back to the utilitarian philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham (Harrison, 1983) , which assumes the response preferences are the expression of a process involving the maximization of utility or rewards (Herrnstein, 2002) . Thus when faced with a choice, rational people will choose the alternatives that provide them with the most reward and the least averse consequences. While maximizing has the basis for much economic theory, there are many questions concerning the psychology of behavioural choice. For example, how do people know which is the 'better' choice, how do they evaluate different 'baskets' of choices and why do some people persist in 'choosing' self-destructive behaviour? Rather than trying to answer these questions by reasoned argument (e.g. selfdestruction is the expression of free will or is in some way reinforcing), an alternative approach developed as a result of studying behavioural choice when faced with two or more reinforcement schedules (Herrnstein, 1974) . This alternative is known as matching theory and there is now a large literature devoted to this subject (Beardsley and McDowell, 1992) .
Matching and maximizing make different behavioural predictions because of how they quantify three main factors. First, is the reward immediately contingent on the behaviour? Second, how does the level of reward change as a behaviour is more frequently chosen ('marginal utility' In contrast maximization involves adding the reinforcement values modified by the probability (P) of each behaviour occurring, say over a oneweek period: P 1 R 1 +P 2 R 2 .
As Figure 4 shows, in some situations they can result in the same behavioural combinations (e.g. a low level of drug use in Figure 4a ) while in others, maximization predicts a low level of drug use, while matching involves moving to higher levels of drug use (Figure 4b ). This happens because continued drug use reduces the reinforcement value of other activities, which is consistent with biographical accounts of drug use (Heyman, 1996) . Heyman (1996) explains how under maximization, individuals could not gradually slide towards a very high level of drug use at the expense of other activities. This is because the longer-term negative consequences of drug use (i.e. financial, social) would have an impact on the drug users' current behavioural choice. In contrast, under matching, the same utility values for drugs and other (conventional) activities can lead to a high level of drug use, because longer-term considerations do not have an impact on current behavioural choices.
A study of pigeons' behaviour by Green and colleagues (1981) illustrates how a choice between immediate but small reinforcement and longer but larger reinforcement leads to matching rather than maximization. At the beginning of every minute, both keys come on. A single peck to either key turned the colours off and immediately started a delay timer. A peck to the green key resulted in delay then 2 seconds access to food. A peck to the red key resulted in delay (plus further 4 second delay) then 4 seconds access to food. The rest of the minute was timed out and the process starts again. If maximizing, red would be chosen every time as this produces the largest reinforcement. However, where the delay is very short (say 0.1 sec), the green key is chosen nearly every time but as the delay increases (say to 4 seconds), the pigeon shifts towards red (60 per cent of the time). This experiment helps to explain situations where people behave as a result of the immediate contingency between behaviour and reward. (Figure 4a ). In Figure 4b , the subjective value of non-drug choices is lower than in Figure 4a while the value of drug choices remains the same. Matching now results in a higher level of drug use
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More commonly however, such behaviour is explained as failure of will power or yielding to temptation. A drug user might explain his behaviour with phrases like 'I really want a hit now'; 'I'm craving for heroin' or 'one hit won't make a difference', etc. The matching law shows that these cognitive states are more likely to be the result of behavioural contingencies than the underlying cause of behaviour.
The conditions under which people match or maximize are not well understood (Heyman, 1996) . When drug users are in treatment they may tend to maximize because drugs are less easily available and consequences are clearly identified by the therapist. When they return to their normal environment, these conditions no longer apply and they may revert to matching. Thus in order to facilitate drug desistance it is necessary to identify the parameters associated with maximization. Tunney and Shanks (2002) have investigated the conditions under which the two types of behaviour occur. They discovered that maximizing is a learning process in which subjects required regular feedback about their performance relative to optimal performance (i.e. maximizing). Second, the learning process is less protracted when the reward structure is relatively simple. Third, penalizing matching behaviour does not lead to more rapid learning of optimal behaviour. However when subjects were given the opportunity to experience how their choices would impact on rewards and punishment structure without actually incurring them, they were more likely to learn to optimize their behaviour. Finally, in all schedules there were large individual differences that the authors interpret as reflecting differences in the rate at which participants learn rather than differences in strategy. All of these findings have implications for drug desistance and await further research.
Although the matching law portrays behaviour as being under the control of environmental factors, Skinner (1953) has shown that an individual can alter their environment by engaging in 'self-control'. Simple strategies include self-reinforcement and self-punishment or informing others of your goals. In a study of dieting, people who reminded themselves about their reasons for dieting in association with an everyday activity (e.g. sitting in a chair), did twice as well as people who received advice or people who were just told to remind themselves of the reasons every day (Hodgson, 1989) .
Hammersley and Reid argue that there 'is a need to reconsider substance abuse as a normal behaviour with social causes ' (2002: 7) . They also criticize many of the current 'anti drugs measures' which they see as 'persecuting minority drug users ' (2002: 27) . In our view, drug dependence arises as a consequence of an unusual (but understandable) set of behavioural contingencies that come into play as a result of the extremely reinforcing nature of drugs. Without measures to counteract this situation, it is likely that some individuals will become drug dependent and inflict damage on themselves and others.
Existentialism is unsatisfactory because it promotes an unsustainable view of human nature. In The Age of Reason by Jean Paul Sartre (1947) the main characters are tormented by their perceived freedom of choice and responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Freedom is a burden for the characters because they regard themselves as isolated individuals having to face the world of 'facticity' (Crowell, no date) (an existential term corresponding to behavioural contingencies). Perhaps, on these terms, the drug addict is leading an 'authentic life' and only betrays 'bad faith' in his dealings with authority figures.
A key question is the degree to which drug addicts require the help of external agencies to effect behavioural change. Haynes and Ayliffe (1991) carefully assessed locus of control among drug users and several control groups. They found that drug users reported having less personal control over their behaviour than non-drug users and suggest that therapies need to modify this so that drug users have increased internal locus of control. Some observers have drawn the opposite conclusion. Peele asks, what are we to make of the fact that about 20 million Americans quit smoking on their own in the decade 1967-75? Is it possible that the very act of turning oneself over to a treatment programme is antagonistic to the feeling of self-efficacy necessary to succeed?
( 1985: 144) Reviewing the literature on the treatment for drug addiction, Leavitt notes that 'the best supported conclusions are that treating someone who does not want to quit rarely succeeds and treating someone who does is often unnecessary ' (1985: 237) . Launched in April 2003, the Drug Intervention Programme (previously known as the Criminal Justice Interventions Programme) uses every opportunity from arrest to post-sentence to get drug-misusing offenders into treatment. This reflects a growing consensus that treatment is the most effective approach to breaking the link between drugs and crime. This appears somewhat contrary to the 'natural desistance' hypothesis postulated by Leavitt. In order to explore this apparent inconsistency, the basis of the Criminal Justice approach to problematic drug use and its consequent interventions must be examined.
The general trend of Criminal Justice treatment is towards acceptance that medical and psychological interventions need to be accompanied by lifestyle work to tackle the correlates of problematic drug use (unemployment, low education, lack of positive/non-criminal relationships), along with increasing faith in the concept of coercive treatment. Both of these trends are particularly evident in the Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO), which was rolled out nationally in 2003 through the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) and directs users into treatment which incorporates medical interventions, compulsory urine testing and management of lifestyle issues (Home Office, 2000) .
The reasoning behind the coercive nature of such treatment is founded in empirical evidence. Contrary to the concerns of academics, probation officers and health professionals that treatment must be voluntary to be
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effective (Home Office, 1999) , a level of coercion into treatment can result in positive outcomes. Research has repeatedly demonstrated a chain of drug programme effectiveness that hinges on coercion, in that coercion helps offending drug users stay in programmes longer (Smith, 1983; Turnbull et al., 2000; Harrison, 2001) , and that the longer an offender stays in a drug programme, the higher the chance of successful outcomes (Appel et al., 2000; Kothari et al., 2002; Scott et al., 2003) . The logic behind the lifestyle element of drug treatment is also clear. Statistics support the view of Hammersley and Reid (2002) that drug use is a socially structured problem; the majority of those problematic users who become caught up in the criminal justice system are from structurally disadvantaged backgrounds. However, in contrast to Hammersley and Reids' view that government policy has failed to understand this, Pearson reports that New Labour's anti-drug strategy does indeed involve 'a recognition that the most serious drug-related problems tend to cluster in the poorest neighbourhoods . . . and also that rehabilitation initiatives for problem drug users need to be combined with programmes of social and economic reintegration ' (1999: 479) .
While some of the research cited earlier supports the notion of natural desistance (such as Leavitt), government policies suggest that intervention is essential. How then can the apparent inconsistency between these be reconciled? It is possible that the discrepancy arises because Leavitt is referring to drug use in the general population, while government policy is concerned with problematic drug use which results in criminality. By its very nature, such problematic drug use appears to be intrinsically bound up in structural problems, evidenced by the fact that most users in the criminal justice system (and particularly those subject to DTTOs) are unemployed, of low education and in unstable accommodation (Turnbull et al., 2000; Eley et al., 2002) . It might be argued that higher social classes are equally experiencing problematic drug use and corresponding criminality, but the likelihood is that their crimes are white collar and our justice system is inherently less able to identify them. This warrants further research, but in the absence of such data what we have to work with is the current government premise that to effect desistance in problematic substance misusers, lifestyle work is vital. What needs to be considered is how or whether this might be compatible with the decision-making processes discussed earlier in the article.
The ability for lifestyle work with substance misusing offenders to effect or affect desistance might be explored using Sutherland's (1955) differential association theory. This social-psychological theory can help explain both how individuals are drawn into drug use and crime as well as structurally explaining why rates of problematic drug use and criminality are higher in certain sections of society (those experiencing higher levels of deprivation) (Lilly et al., 2002) . The theory suggests that the process of becoming or remaining criminal is due to the fact that behaviour is learned via intimate personal groups and that individuals' decisions are therefore influenced by their associations. Different groups will have differing definitions of legal codes and delinquency stemming from an excess of definitions favourable to the violation of law. Learning via association with criminal or anti-criminal patterns both involve the same learning mechanisms (Sutherland and Cressey, 1970, in Lilly et al., 2002) . The theory also explains why the vast majority of problematic users in the criminal justice system are from disadvantaged backgroundsSutherland proposes that structural determinants-unemployment, low levels of education and lack of formal and informal social control, raise the possibility of criminal associations, behaviours and opportunities (Sutherland, in Hagan and McCarthy, 1997) .
Certainly those with problematic drug use are often involved in criminality and are embedded in criminal groups (other users, dealers, fencers, etc.), from whom criminal and drug using values, as well as tutelage in using drugs and accessing illegitimate income to procure drugs, are gained (Gorman and White, 1995; Cheung and Cheung, 2003) . This represents an excess of criminal definitions (or, in Sutherland's terms, definitions favourable to the violation of law). Research also supports the other side of this equation, which is that desistance occurs when individuals increase their associations with positive or anti-criminal traits such as good family relationships, quality employers and non-drug using friends (Sampson and Laub, 1993; Hagan and McCarthy, 1997; Cheung and Cheung, 2003 ).
Sutherland's theory has received considerable support from critics for its contribution to the understanding of criminality (Einstadter and Henry, 1995) , although a principal criticism of the theory is its failure to specify the direction of causality-i.e. whether individual delinquency influences the choice of peer group or vice versa (Gorman and White, 1995) . However, this shortcoming is less relevant in this instance (than for example work tackling preventative drug use measures) as we are concerned here with desistance rather than initiation of drug use. Whichever the direction of causality, the intervention implied for the Criminal Justice System is the same-to assist problematic drug users in the transition out of their circle of delinquent peers and into more positive associations. Programmes such as the DTTO, which include education, employment and relationship work, appear to be aiming to achieve just that, although (possibly due to implementation issues), the programme has so far experienced only limited success in persuading users to desist or at least reduce their substance misuse and related criminality (53 per cent of completers versus 91 per cent of those whose orders were revoked re-offended) (Home Office, 2003) .
To conclude, this article shows that desistance cannot be considered as a unitary phenomenon. Within the general population there is strong evidence for a high degree of natural desistance. The dominant view is that transition from recreational to problematic drug use is underpinned by neurological processes. Furthermore these processes are accompanied by a diminution of voluntary control. Again, current thinking is that this can only be restored through medical intervention. The evidence for this account of drug desistance is equivocal. A type of learning theory, based on the principles of the matching law, offers a highly empirical approach to problematic drug use desistance. This sees drug use as a continual choice between drug use and other alternatives and drugs will be chosen whenever the momentary rewards are higher than other behaviours. Finally we consider how this approach is consistent with current criminological approaches that regard treatment for drug use as part of a holistic approach to increase the value of non-drug use behaviours. 3 In the year prior to interview drug dependence was measured by asking all those who had used drugs in the past year a series of five questions. These covered: daily use of the drug for two weeks or more; feelings of dependence; inability to cut down; need for increasing quantities; withdrawal symptoms. One positive response to any of these questions was considered to be evidence of drug dependence. The drugs covered in the survey were cannabis, amphetamines, crack, cocaine, ecstasy, tranquillizers, opiates and volatile substances. 4 http://www.drugs.gov.uk/drugs-laws/cannabis-reclassifications/ (accessed 10 October 2005).
Notes

